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Abstract
Panel survey data indicated that about 47 percent of total land-poor (defined 
as household owning less than half an acre of land) rural households were non-par-
ticipants in microcredit programs in Bangladesh. This exploratory study was con-
ducted to have an appraisal of microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) peer-monitoring 
model or group-based activities in Bangladesh that would help to identify key access 
barriers to micro-entrepreneurship and microcredit initiatives. The sample was taken 
on a random basis from Gazipur, Savar and Narayanganj around Dhaka city. The 
respondents (non-members of MFIs) were asked to evaluate their judgments on dif-
ferent objects selected in the questionnaire. Respondents ranked the attributes on a 
number of itemized five-point scale ratings bounded at each end by one of two bipo-
lar adjectives. The result of this study indicated that two types of forces are active in 
this dissociation of the rural ultra-poor with MFIs. One is self-exclusion and the 
other is indirect-push-exclusion by the MFIs. Besides, there have been some identi-
fied factors in principal component factor analysis that are heavily weighted by the 
respondents as the key access barriers such as tight repayment methods of loan, high 
costs of credit, disciplinary imperatives, loan use opportunity, risk of loan and reli-
gious restrictions. The regression analysis shows that loan repayment method, loan 
utilization opportunities and religious restrictions are significant variables that play 
major role in the nonparticipation of the rural poor in microcredit programs in rural 
Bangladesh. Hence, similar to many others, the findings of this study conclude that 
microcredit is not the only way out for all the rural poor to resolve poverty.
บทคัดย่อ
ผลการศึกษาแบบสำรวจ (Panel Survey) พบว่า ร้อยละ 47 ของครอบครัวยากจนในชนบทซึ่งเป็นครอบครัว
ที่ครอบครองพื้นที่น้อยกว่าครึ่งเอเคอร์ เป็นผู้ที่ไม่อยู่ในโครงการสินเชื่อขนาดเล็ก (Microcredit Program)
ของประเทศบังคลาเทศ การศึกษาครั้งนี้เป็นการสำรวจเพื่อประเมินรูปแบบการกำกับดูแลโดยกลุ่ม (Peer-Moni-
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toring) หรือกิจกรรมแบบรวมกลุ่ม (Group-Based Activities) ของสถาบันการเงินฐานราก (MFIs) ในประเทศ
บังคลาเทศ เพื่อค้นหาอุปสรรคสำคัญในการเริ่มต้นประกอบธุรกิจขนาดเล็กและการให้สินเชื่อขนาดเล็ก
กลุ่มตัวอย่างในการศึกษาเป็นประชากรที่สุ่มมาจากเขตกัลซีปู ซาวาร์ และนาราเยนกัช ซึ่งอยู่ใกล้เมืองดัคคา
กลุ่มตัวอย่างซ่ึงไม่ได้เป็นสมาชิกของสถาบันการเงินฐานรากได้ตอบแบบสอบถามโดยการจัดลำดับความสำคัญ
ข้อความท่ีแสดงคุณสมบัติซ่ึงใช้ระดับคะแนน 5 ระดับ ผลการศึกษาพบว่ามี 2 ปัจจัยหลักท่ีมีผลต่อการท่ีประชากร
แยกตัวออกจากสถาบันการเงินฐานราก  คือการแยกตัวตนเอง (Self-exclusion) และการแยกตัวออกโดยปัจจัยกดดัน
ทางอ้อม (Indirect-push-exclusion) จากสถาบันการเงินฐานราก นอกจากนั้นยังมีปัจจัยอื่นๆ ที่ประชากร
กลุ่มตัวอย่างจัดว่าเป็นอุปสรรคสำคัญ ได้แก่ วิธีชำระเงินกู้ท่ีเข้มงวด ต้นทุนท่ีสูงของสินเช่ือ ระเบียบท่ีเข้มงวด
โอกาสในการใช้เงินกู้ ความเส่ียงของเงินกู้ และข้อจำกัดทางศาสนา ผลการวิเคราะห์ถดถอย (Regression Analy-
sis) พบว่า วิธีการชำระเงินคืน โอกาสในการใช้เงินกู้ และข้อจำกัดทางศาสนาเป็นตัวแปรสำคัญที่ทำให้
ประชากรที่ยากจนในพื้นที่ชนบทของประเทศบังคลาเทศไม่มีส่วนร่วมในโครงการสินเชื่อขนาดเล็ก ดังนั้น
การศึกษาครั้งนี้จึงมีข้อสรุปสอดคล้องกับการศึกษาครั้งก่อนๆ คือ การให้สินเชื่อขนาดเล็ก ไม่ใช่วิธีในการ
แก้ปัญหาความยากจน
1. INTRODUCTION
Microfinance --- the provision of finan-
cial services such as small loans to the
world’s poor --- has grown in the past de-
cade, extending billions of dollars in credit
to tens of millions of people. A major aim of
the microfinance movement is to provide
funds for investment in micro- businesses,
thus lifting people out of poverty and pro-
moting economic growth. Recent experience
and the economic history of rich countries,
however, suggest that those expectations are
unrealistic (Dichter 2007). Panel survey data
indicated that in 1998/99, about 47 percent
of total land-poor (defined as household
owning less than half an acre of land) rural
households were non-participants in
microcredit programs in Bangladesh
(Khandkar 2006). Nevertheless, the ultra-
poor (poorer than the poor mostly landless),
especially the ill, disabled, the elderly, mi-
grants remain unrepresented. With self-em-
ployment being potentially an important live-
lihood option for the ultra-poor, this out-
reach gap of almost half of the rural poor
and ultra-poor is an important matter of
concern. Available appraisal of microfinance
institutions’ (MFIs’) peer-monitoring model
or group-based activities in Bangladesh
stressed the lack of physical, human, but
also social capital as key access barriers to
micro-entrepreneurship and microcredit
(Zeller et al., 2001). This has led some to
argue that microfinance is perhaps not suit-
able for many of the ultra-poor and for ex-
panding coverage of social safety nets. In
this background, further research is war-
ranted to capture the cases of improving
outreach to different segments of the ultra-
poor in microfinance initiatives or to explore
the future potential alternatives to this con-
ventional approach of microfinance institu-
tions. However, the first issue is to concen-
trate on: What are the reasons or factors
responsible for the non-participation of
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about half of the poor of the rural areas in
microfinance initiatives? As several alterna-
tive MFIs are currently attempting to go
deeper in their poverty outreach, the re-
search would share the experience of those
initiatives and link with further assessments
of ultra-poverty in Bangladesh.
The present study is, thus, based on em-
pirical evidence of some selected areas of
Bangladesh that focuses only on the rural
ultra-poor who are eligible to be in the safety
nets of microfinance programs available in
the areas, such as the GB, BRAC and ASA,
but are not participating. The prime objec-
tive is, therefore, to identify the factors be-
hind this non-participation of the poor and
ultra-poor in some selected rural areas of
Bangladesh that limits the frontiers of MFIs
as a whole.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Microfinance is the provision of a broad
range of financial services such as deposits,
loans, payment services, money transfers
and insurance to a poor and low income
household and the microenterprises (ADB
2000). Some development experts warned
that microcredit programs did little to alle-
viate overall poverty, even in countries like
Bangladesh where they are well established.
About 45 percent of the country’s popula-
tion lives below the poverty line, down just
2 points in the past decades (Kingsbury
2007). MFIs, particularly GB and BRAC
(Bangladesh Rural Advancement Commit-
tee), have been criticized for many reasons.
Bornstein (1999) attacked on the impact of
these microcredit institutions on society at
large. In his view, MFIs put rigorous social
control measures and many disciplinary im-
peratives, which reminded us the concern
of Dyal-Chand (2007a).
Sharma (2000) were also experienced
difficulties in finding a satisfactory method-
ology in conducting impact research. For
example, the level of entrepreneurial skill is
likely to affect an individual’s decision to join
a microfinance program. But because en-
trepreneurial skill is hard to observe and to
quantify, this makes it difficult to obtain s
clean estimate of the effects of improved
access.
Another factor is that the group mecha-
nism does not make things easier for the
poor. Evans et al. (1999), Wood and Sharif
(1997), Morduch (1998), Hulme and
Mosley (1996) maintained that would-be
members of GB and BRAC often did not
want to take the bottom poor into their
group. The lenders of the GB and BRAC
regarded them as too risky. MFIs often pre-
ferred the richer-poor as clients to the bot-
tom-poor, since they were more capable to
assure the sustainability of the organizations.
These authors also asserted that the bot-
tom-poor often considered a loan to be too
risky. Having few assets and fearing an even
greater burden of debt, they did not want
to take part in a microcredit system.
Dyal-Chand (2007a) raised an im-
mensely insightful question in terms of col-
lateral hinged on the GB micro-lending pro-
cess that imposed human worth as collat-
eral. The term ‘human worth’ locally called
‘ijjat’ means family status, honor and respect.
There have been many incidents inwhich
debtors committed suicide in the extreme
cases. Dyal-Chand (2007a) reported one
such use in Bangladesh where a woman cap-
tive in a house of the GB compound used
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her ‘sari’ to hang herself from the ceiling fan,
having faced with the loss of honor to her
family as a result to her failure to repay the
loans. The GB is enforcing this collateral by
group lending or group solidarity. Dyal-
Chand (2005), asked the question whether
microcredit is a cure for entrenched pov-
erty or not. She herself answered based on
the information available to her, “There aren’t
the statistics to prove that yet” (Kingsbury
2007, p.43). She is, indeed, a vociferous
critique of the GB and micro-lending
projects and her experience and work on
microfinance programs created a negative
image of this “new paradigm” of develop-
ment in the intellectual community.  Dyal-
Chand estimated that at least half of devel-
opment aid had been diverted to micro-lend-
ing over the past two decades and there
remained nothing sexy about hospitals,
schools, roads, sanitation projects, but all
these things the truly poor desperately
needed. Dyal Chand (2007b) asserted that
the law professionals had a role to play in
order to protect the honor of the credit con-
sumers from the demeanors of the donors
from the individual and social point of per-
spective.
While conventional microfinance insti-
tutions (MFIs) have expanded operations
in the last more than two decades, poverty-
focused MFIs based on Islamic principles
are lagging behind. Ahmed (2002; 2004a)
provided the theoretical basis, operational
framework and empirical support for the
establishment of Islamic MFIs. After criti-
cally evaluating the conventional MFIs, an
Islamic alternative is presented. The theo-
retical as well as the empirical parts of the
paper showed that there was a great po-
tentiality of Islamic MFIs that could cater
for the needs of the poor. Ahmed (2004b)
acknowledged the social dimension of bank-
ing programs and focused on the way of
manifesting the social role of Islamic banks
to provide finance to the poor to increase
their income and wealth. This paper inves-
tigated if a marriage between Islamic banks
and micro-financing was possible or not. The
paper argued that there had been a strong
case for such a union as Islamic banks could
deliver finance to the poor more efficiently
and effectively. The theoretical arguments
were supported by empirical evidence of
the Rural Development Scheme, a
microfinance Program of the Islamic Bank
Bangladesh Limited. The article of Ahmed
(2007), explored the potentiality of the
Awaqf-based microfinance in the society to
uplift the condition of the poor realizing the
social part of Islamic finance to play. The
author also discussed about a few other di-
mensions of the Islamic principles such as
Zakah and Sadaqah as well. Overall, his
findings suggest that operational costs in-
curred much less in the case of IMFs than
the conventional MFIs.
Segrado (2005) examined Islamic
microfinance from the socially responsible
investment perspectives. The paper dis-
cussed about different tools of Islamic
microfinance that could lead to a successful
venture. Hassan and Lewis (2004) placed
an introduction on the Islamic financing and
Islamic banking perspective. Iqbal (2004)
provided an overview of the current posi-
tion of Islamic financing at a global level,
covering developments in banking, invest-
ment funds and the Islamic international fi-
nancial institutions.
Develtere and Huybrechts (2005) as-
sert that the effect of microcredit programs
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on nonmembers has received little attention
by researchers. In a way or another, non-
member groups in the villages can be
touched by the microcredit institutions. It is
still worth looking at what we know about
the indirect effects and impacts of the
microcredit programs of Grameen Bank and
BRAC. According to him a more direct ef-
fect of microcredit will be felt in the credit
market since the supply of total credit avail-
able will increase, leading to a decline in the
interest rate.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Conceptual Framework
This study investigated the factors af-
fecting nonparticipation of the rural poor
who are eligible to get membership in the
microcredit institutions to have the loans, but
are not actually participating. There have
been identified seven socioeconomic fac-
tors which affect the decisions of the people
not to be involved in the microfinance pro-
grams which can help to alleviate the rural
poverty in the rural areas of Bangladesh.
Membership criteria are unique in
microcredit programs, most of which fol-
low the peer monitoring ideals or group
membership. Besides, Most of the
microcredit organizations put disciplinary
obligations which include the training pro-
gram among other components such as
physical exercise, queuing for getting loan
and weekly meetings. As most of the clients
of microcredit organizations are female, all
these obligations could spark the religious
sentiments in the households of the nonpar-
ticipants.
Cost of credit is another important di-
mension for considering as one of the rea-
sons for the rural poor not to be involved in
the micro business of the microcredit orga-
nizations. The costs include interest charged
by the institutions, service charges, forced
pension fund charge, emergency fund
charge and others, which cost as high as 60
percent on a cumulative basis (Kingsbury
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for identifying the reasons behind nonparticipation
of the rural poor in microcredit programs in Bangladesh
Membership Criteria
Cost of Credit
Loan Repayment Policy
Loan Utilizing Opportunities Nonparticipation in Microcredit Programs
Information
Religious Regulation
Risk of Loan
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2007). Undoubtedly, this is extremely high
cost that leads the microenterprises to the
high risk of losses in the business. If the in-
ternal rate of return cannot reach as much
as 60 percent of the overall cost of credit,
the risk factor would be higher that could
put the small business in losing concern. This
fact of losing concern would adversely af-
fect the loan repayment, which is due on
weekly basis. Owing to this reason, about
24 percent beneficiaries reported that half
of their first loan was repaid by the respec-
tive microcredit institutions themselves by
deducting the outstanding from the princi-
pal amount of the second and third loan when
they expressed their inability to repay it.
About 12 percent members complained of
misbehavior and threat from the officials of
microcredit organizations. About 28.4 per-
cent sold out valuables and 26.8 percent
borrowed from different sources of fund for
repaying the loan (Ullah and Routray 2007).
Thus, cost of credit, risk of loan and loan
repayment policy are interrelated and play
crucial role to determine the decision not to
be the member of the microcredit organiza-
tions.
Information is costly and that could be
symmetric or asymmetric in nature for which
adverse selection may take place in terms
of having membership in the microfinance
programs. Ullah and Routray (2007) termed
it as the problem of institutional transpar-
ency in which about 85 percent of the re-
spondents reported that they did not know
the rate of interest and other charges. They
just know to pay weekly installment. This
information gap may pose a factor for dis-
couraging the rural poor not to get mem-
bership in the microcredit organizations.
Religious principles put bar to the inter-
est element as well as free movement with-
out the purdah (cover-up) for the female
members of the microcredit institutions.
These factors are necessarily correlated with
the satisfaction measure of the microcredit
beneficiaries. Loan utilizing opportunities are
also an important dimension for which the
business success depends on. Without
proper marketing strategy applicable to a
particular location, the businesses could be
in failure status. Hence, all these seven fac-
tors are included in the model as the deter-
mining variables to affect the
nonparticipation of the rural poor in
microcredit programs in Bangladesh.
3.2 Data Sources and Analytical Mea-
sures
The survey was restricted in the areas
like Gazipur, Savar and Narayanganj around
Dhaka city in Bangladesh where the
Grameen Bank, BRAC-Bangladesh Rural
Advancement committee, ASA, Proshika
and other MFIs are presently working. The
survey was conducted during the period
from August to December of 2007. A struc-
tured questionnaire was used in the survey.
The respondents were all females who were
asked to what degree their judgment cor-
responded on the 26 variables related to 5
dimensions of perception difference model.
The items were applied to measure on a 5
point “Likert type” scale (Likert 1932). In
the measurement, scale 1 indicates strongly
disagree and scale 5 indicates strongly agree.
The questionnaire was pre-tested and finally
data were collected from 200 female re-
spondents. Then, the sample of 169 is
drawn on a random selection basis. The
respondents have been interviewed through
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personal visits to the areas. The respondents
selected the appropriate point the best in-
dicated how they would describe the at-
tributes being rated.
The reliability test has been conducted
to verify the internal consistency of the vari-
ables obtained in the sample. For this test,
the Cronbach’s alpha formula, α = N. / [1
+ (N-1).] has been used; where, N is the
number of items and  is the average inter-
item correlation among the items. The
Cronbach’s alpha value is found 0.7819,
which is much higher than the minimum ac-
ceptable level suggested by Nunnally
(1978). Several statistical analytical tech-
niques such as Factor Analysis, Descriptive
Statistics and Correlation Analyses, Multiple
Regression Analysis, ANOVA have been
used to measure their attitude level towards
those particular MFIs on the basis of seven
controlled variables or factors specified in
the questionnaire.
4. DATA ANALYSES AND INTER-
PRETATIONS
A principal component factor analysis
was conducted on the 26 variables related
to microcredit programs, which formed
seven main factors with eigenvalues greater
than one (Table 1). This seven factors-so-
lution accounts for about 59% (58.675%)
of the variance in the data on attitudes to-
wards the GB, BRAC and ASA in
Bangladesh. That means about 40% vibra-
tions could be explained by other factors,
which are not included in the model of analy-
ses of this study. The study shows that loan
repayment policy, cost of credit, member-
ship criteria, loan use opportunity, risk of
loan and religious restrictions are important
to the people those who are not participat-
ing in the microcredit programs. Thus, those
are the factors that matter and hinder the
poor and ultra-poor to join in the
microcredit institutions in Bangladesh.
In terms of the respondents’ judgment,
loan repayment policy came top to consider
not joining the MF programs, which is con-
gruent to the findings of Zeller et al. (2001).
This factor accounts for the one-sixth part
of variance consists of seven variables.
Eigenvalue for this factor is 4.266, which
indicates that this factor contains more in-
formation than other factors. This factor
provides the maximum insights of
microcredit programs that are active in the
study areas. The mean values of three vari-
ables included in this controlled factor are
3.1598, 3.0533 and 3.2012 respectively.
In the 5-point scale, these mean values rep-
resent somewhat negative level of dissatis-
faction towards the existing MFIs in the ar-
eas concerned. Hence, those selected MFIs
such as the GB, BRAC and ASA and oth-
ers microcredit institutions should take this
matter into their consideration for further
improvements in the microcredit programs
to improve their outreach and to alleviate
the rural poverty in Bangladesh.
The second important factor is costs of
credit that accounts for 8.99% of the vari-
ance and it broadly includes interest rates
charge, service charge, forced savings
charge, pension saving charge and oppor-
tunity costs as well. The mean values of
these variables are 2.1953, 2.4852, 2.9882,
3.1657 and 2.9053 respectively.  In the
scale point, these mean values indicate the
positive assertions that all those charges are
very high in the respondents’ judgment. It
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has an eigenvalue of 2.884. The factor load-
ing points for these variables are consider-
ably higher that range from .69 to .83. That
means these variables contain immense sig-
nificance in terms of the costs of the MF
programs of those three MFIs in
Bangladesh. This finding supports the study
of Littlefield and Rosenberg (2004) who
showed that most of the top-performing
MFIs in some countries are more profitable
than the top-performing local commercial
banks. What does it imply? Who pay for
the profits? The answer is given by the case
study on the GB’s poor female clients in
Bangladesh done by Rahman (1999) who
asked the same question: “Who Pay?” and
Table 1: The Principal Component Factor Analysis
Factor               Variables  Factor % of Cron-
Name*  Loading Variance bach's
Explained Reliabi-
(Cumu- lity Coef-
lative) ficient
Repay- 12. Not satisfied with repay policy    .696  10.467 .73
ment Po- 13. Not satisfied with weekly pay    .544  (10.467)
licy (4.266) 14. Not satisfied with repay cycle    .644
Cost of 7. Interest rates are not very high    .838  8.990 .72
Credit 8. Service charge is not very high    .785  (19.457)
(2.884) 9. Forced saving rate is not high    .766
10. Forced pension saving is not high    .691
11. Opportunity cost is not high    .708
Member- 1. Not satisfied with gender-biased criteria    .516  8.840 .57
ship 2. Not satisfied with group-based activities    .531  (28.296)
Criteria 3. Not satisfied with weekly meeting   .638
(2.088) 4. Not satisfied with physical exercise rule  -.514
5. Not satisfied with monitoring criteria    .734
6. Not satisfied with amount of loan    .724
Loan Use 15. Don't have relevant business skill    .753  8.113 .66
Opportu- 16. Not satisfied with specified  investment    .573  (36.409)
nity (1.84) 17. Prescribed loan investment is not profitable
   .593
showed that micro-lenders regularly fail to
help people attain permanent self-employ-
ment, often because they fail to ensure that
the loans are actually used by their borrow-
ers to start small business. After all, profit-
ability --- the extent to which revenues ex-
ceed costs of providing services --- is a re-
flection of the extent to which returns to cli-
ents from whatever they finance are high
enough to pay for the financial services they
received (Sharma 2000).  And that costs
sometimes as high as 60 percent (Littlefield
2007).  The third most important compo-
nent factor found here in the study is mem-
bership criteria.
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Risk of 24. Not satisfied with risk sharing policy    .538  7.563 .61
Loan 25. Not scared of getting default    .461  (43.972)
(1.488) 26. risk is not substantial    .473
Religious 21. Not satisfied with interest-based business    .524  7.298 .66
Regulation 22. My husband does not like me to out for loan    .801  (51.535)
(1.437) 23. My husband does not like me to do business     .773
Informa- 18. Don't have information gap    .479  7.140 .57
tion 19. Did not collect information from NGOs.    .555  (58.675)
(1.183) 20. Did not get information from other
members of the NGOs    .755
*Numbers in the parentheses in the first column represent eigenvalues of the corre-
sponding factors.
Factor               Variables  Factor % of Cron-
Name*  Loading Variance bach's
Explained Reliabi-
(Cumu- lity Coef-
lative) ficient
The variables under this factor are mainly
the group-based activity and some other
formalities to comply and those are not liked
by the nonmembers. Not only this, the peer
pressure is a kind of humiliation when debt
gets default. Dyal-Chand (2007) has an ar-
ticle on this human collateral and peer pres-
sure that was awarded a grand prize in the
United States. The microcredit is free of
material collateral but not of social and family
respect and honor that sometimes get highly
vulnerable on which examples abound in the
case of MFIs in Bangladesh (Rahman
1999).
The loan utilization opportunity that
cropped up in this study is another impor-
tant factor responsible for precluding the
poor villagers from the microcredit entre-
preneurial chemes. This is somewhat a bi-
zarre assumption that all the poor are en-
trepreneurial. The distribution of entrepre-
neurial character is pretty much the same
everywhere in the world. The case of the
MFIs in Bangladesh is not an exception to
that. Some people have that skill, some do
not. Thus, it is surprising that many people
think the poor in developing countries are
nascent business people. Even in the West,
only a minority makes their careers as en-
trepreneurs (Dichter 2007). Hence, the find-
ing here in this study also result into similar
evidence that many of the poor and ultra-
poor do not like to be involved in the busi-
ness, because they think they don't have that
kind of skill to be an entrepreneurs. Another
reason is that many people think that busi-
ness always involves some sorts of risks and
uncertainties. This factor came just after the
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loan use opportunity. Hence, this outcome
realistically fit many of the poor people’s
psychology. The risk is also scary, because
the consequence of defaulting in a loan re-
payment is a matter of social and personal
humiliation and insult, which is evident in the
study of Rahman (1999) and Dual-Chand
(2007a).
The Islamic religious sentiment against
interest based finance is predominant in
many Muslim countries and Bangladesh is
one of them. As a matter of truth, owing to
this factor, many conventional national and
multi-national commercial banks opened the
Islamic banking schemes in parallel to their
daily general activities.  So the result of this
study also matches with the ideal thinking
of the Muslim poor in the Muslim countries
such as Bangladesh.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correla-
tion Analyses
Table 2 presents the means, standard
deviations and correlations between all the
control variables in the study. On average,
study participants estimated their attitudes
towards the microcredit programs in nega-
tive sentiment. All the mean values of the
factors are in favor of that conclusion. Spe-
cifically, cost of credit shows negative cor-
relations with overall satisfaction and loan
repayment policy. It makes sense that cost
of credit and loan repayment policy has a
significant and negative relation to each
other. These negative relationships indicate
that the respondents answered the questions
consistently.
Table 2: Mean, Standard Deviation and Correlation Coefficient
Factors Mean Std. OS MC CC LRP LUO INF RR
Dev.
Overall Satisfaction (OS)  3.08 1.30
Membership Criteria (MC)  3.10   .76 .23***
Cost of Credit (CC)  2.75  .84 -.09 .10*
Loan Repayment Policy
(LRP)  3.13 1.08 .45*** .35*** -.2***
Loan Use Opp. (LUO)  3.31   .97 .33*** .16** .07 .31***
Information (INF)  2.86 1.00 .10 .07 .24*** .19*** .29***
Religious Regulations (RR)  3.08 1.06 .53*** .30*** .03 .34*** .37*** .18*
Risk of Loan (RL)  3.03  .81 .16** .28*** .15** .20*** .33*** .21** .37***
*P < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 N = 169
Overall, the study uncovers the fact that
the poor nonmembers of the GB, BRAC
and ASA are not participating in the
microfinance programs by the reasons of
those explicit causes. Nevertheless, there
must have some other factors unfolded here
have not included in this study.
4.2 Multiple Regression Analyses
In the analysis, step-wise regression
technique was used. Overall satisfaction and
7 orthogonal component factors were taken
as dependent and independent variables re-
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spectively. Results are shown in Table 3. In
the table all variables are shown with their
respective regression coefficients (βs) and
computed student’s t statistics along with
their respective significance level. Results of
the regression analyses revealed that out of
seven control variables, three such as loan
repayment policy, loan utilization opportu-
nity and religious restrictions, had a statisti-
cally significant effect on the rating of atti-
tude towards overall satisfaction of the
microcredit programs. These factors are the
main barriers for the non-participant of the
microfinance programs. Those are basically
responsible to breach the link between the
poor and the MFIs. These results are also
consistent to the results found in the factor
analyses. The findings also showed that the
factors such as costs of credit, information
and risk of loans are exhibiting negative re-
lationships with the overall satisfaction level,
which are quite reasonable.
Apart from these outcomes, there has
been several evidence that MFIs such as
the GB and BRAC do not reach the bot-
tom poor. Montgomery et al. (1996) and
Khandkar (1999) have indicated that 15 to
30 percent of BRAC members do not be-
long to the target group. For Grameen Bank,
similar figures were found. Also Amin et al.
(1999) found that microcredit is less suc-
cessful at reaching the vulnerable poor.
Another factor is that group mechanism
does not make things easier for the poor.
Evans et al. (1999) Hashemi et al. (1996)
and Hulme and Mosley (1996) say that
would-be members of Grameen Bank and
BRAC often do not want to take the bot-
tom poor into their group. They regard them
as too risky. Microcredit institutions them-
selves often prefer the richer as clients since
they are more likely to ensure the
sustainability of the organizations. Nonethe-
less, there have also been opposite perspec-
tives on the part of client-related access
barriers. Hashemi et al (1996), Morduch
(1998), Evans et al. (1999) and Hulme and
Mosley (1996) agree that the bottom poor
often consider a loan to be too risky, which
is also in compliance with the result of the
present study.  Having few assets and fear-
ing an even greater burden of debt, they do
not want to take part in a microcredit
scheme. Even when they take a loan, they
can get into trouble if the returns from in-
vestment fall short of the cost of borrowing.
The net result is that the poorest fall through
the net (Develtere and Huybrechts 2005).
Table 3: Results of Multiple Regression Analyses
Variables R2     F Beta      t
Control Variables 0.38 14.01***
Membership Criteria .025 .356
Cost of Credit -.042 -.621
Repayment Policy .273 3.673***
Loan Utilization Opportunity .121 1.687+
Information about Microcredit Program -.039 -.568
Religious Regulations .428 5.884***
Risk of Loan -.087 -1.227
+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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5. CONCLUSION
The outcome of the current study pro-
vides strong support for the perspective that 
majority of the poor and ultra-poor are not 
covered by the MFIs working in the rural 
areas of Bangladesh, provenance of 
microcredit programs. Some of the factors 
are identified here in this study, but there 
might have been several other arcane facts 
that fall on the part of MFIs themselves. So, 
there have been two types of centrifugal 
forces that are pushing the vulnerable poor 
of the rural areas not to be converging on 
the center of the microfinance programs ---
one is self exclusion by the non-clients them-
selves and pushing out by the MFIs is the 
other. The key factors are identified in the 
study that loan repayment policy, loan utili-
zation opportunity and religious restrictions 
are the main and significant impediments re-
sponsible for the nonparticipation of the eli-
gible rural poor in the microcredit programs 
in Bangladesh. Hence, similar to others, the 
conclusion of this study could be drawn here 
that the frontiers of microcredit program is 
trapped to a mid-way juncture despite the 
fact of the earlier declaration by the 
Grameen Bank which vowed to alleviate 
entire rural poverty of Bangladesh by the 
year 2015. However, it is looming out here 
that microcredit programs have a long fur-
ther way to go to finish this noble job in or-
der to eradicate rural poverty from its root 
level in the society of Bangladesh.
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